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762 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 
This account of the moral good creates two persistent problems in the 
interpretation of the text of Aquinas. First, it undercuts the teleological 
cast of Thomas's ethics. F. visibly struggles with Aquinas's eudaemonism, 
the thesis that happiness constitutes the ultimate goal of human moral 
endeavor. F. admits that Aquinas designates religious contemplation as the 
supreme good of the human person, next to which other goods are sec-
ondary. But F. argues implausibly that this thesis implies no subordination 
of other goods. 
Second, the thesis that goods may not be directly harmed governs a 
strained interpretation of the use of lethal force in defense of the innocent. 
Although he admits that the text of Thomas oftens seems to justify the 
intention to kill an aggressor, F. struggles to prove that Aquinas actually 
sought only the incapacitation, not the death, of the aggressor. However, 
when F. tries to apply this theory to the case of Stauffenberg, the German 
officer who tried to assassinate Hitler (291), even he admits that this im-
putation of a nonlethal intention defies common sense. 
F.'s reconstruction of Aquinas effectively presents a more modern 
Thomas than that of the standard version: more egalitarian, more consti-
tutional, more pacifistic. In his brilliant retrieval of the four orders, F. has 
handed us a deeply libertarian Thomas. But the fidelity of this portrait to 
the text of Aquinas and the soft teleology of this portrait will provoke 
further debate. 
Fordham University, New York JOHN J. CONLEY, S.J. 
PROCESS, PRAXIS AND TRANSCENDENCE. By James L. Marsh. SUNY Series 
in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Albany: State University of New 
York, 1999. Pp. xiii + 370. 
This text is extremely hard to categorize. It is at one and the same time 
a philosophy of liberation, a metaphysics, a Christian apologetics, a socio-
political ethic, and a prophetic vision. For Marsh, it is the culmination and 
completion of work done in two previous volumes, Post-Cartesian Medi-
tations (1988) and Critique, Action and Liberation (1994). The ample ref-
erencing back to these earlier works, however, enables the reader to en-
gage this text without benefit of acquaintance with the earlier two. 
Part 1 in six chapters establishes M.'s philosophy of religion. He demol-
ishes both modern and postmodern critiques of metaphysics, insisting upon 
a philosophical approach that owes much to Lonergan's investigations into 
the transcendental structure of the human subject and to the idea of God 
from process metaphysics. His radical metaphysics, championing differen-
tiation and difference, leads to an anticapitalist moral-political option for 
the marginalized. A process, neoclassical idea of God allows for the incor-
poration of difference within the idea of God. A kind of process/neo-
classical form of the ontological argument, moving from the intelligibility 
of being to the necessity of transcendent being, establishes that the God 
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whose "idea" is earlier outlined actually exists. God as the absolute "thou" 
grounds the true freedom of disposability. By combining Whiteheadian 
metaphysics and Marxian social theory, a bridge can be built between 
metaphysics and praxis. 
Part 2 contains eight chapters, advancing the general thesis that the 
praxis that follows from the religious metaphysics outlined in Part 1 is one 
in which a Christian (actually primarily Catholic) religious vision coheres 
with and underpins a radical democratic socialist politics and ethics. M. first 
establishes the universality of Christ in what is a surprisingly traditional 
and even at times seemingly quite dyspeptic apologetic, and follows it with 
a chapter on Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche which, despite its clarity and 
common sense about the limitations and the value of these masters of 
suspicion, seems to advance the argument in no discernible way. M. makes 
connections between liberation theology and democratic socialism, and 
pays homage to Lonergan's discussion of the forms of conversion. Several 
chapters utilize Kierkegaard very interestingly in a theological reading of 
Habermas's critical theory. Finally M. make a good case for the need for 
the Christian churches to commit to a prophetic stand against the late 
capitalism of the "new world order." 
While the component parts of this argument are on the whole derivative, 
and M. makes no attempt to hide his debts, the real value of this work lies 
much more in the richness of the mix that M. has created. In the first place, 
he has put thinkers into creative relationship with one another in often 
quite a novel way—Whitehead and Marx, for example, or in particularly 
impressive fashion, Kierkegaard and Habermas. He draws the structure of 
his work from Hegel, the method largely from Lonergan, and the inspira-
tion from process thought and critical theory, but the insights that emerge 
from the mix are very definitely his own. Second, his ability to connect 
closely metaphysics and praxis, and in a different way religious and political 
conversion, challenges both the common contemporary assumption that 
there is a disconnection between religion and political involvement, and the 
equally frequently voiced assumption that only a fuzzy liberalism can as-
sociate the two at all. At the same time, M. refreshingly represents a vision 
that is politically radical without needing to be theologically conservative. 
The limitations of this work, vastly outweighed by its virtues, lie in a 
certain dogmatism, both philosophical and religious. The philosophical ver-
sion I attribute to the intellectual boorishness of the Lonerganian system. 
Transcendental method is something of a juggernaut, and woe to those who 
get in its path. So, for example, the logic of the move from the intelligibility 
of being to belief in God is so self-evident to M. that other points of view 
are simply swept aside. Marx, Freud, Nietzsche, Habermas, Kant, Derrida, 
Heidegger and many others are ultimately wrong, despite their real value, 
on precisely these grounds. But if you prove to them that their rejection of 
the ultimate intelligibility of being traps them in transcendental contradic-
tion, why, they will shrug their philosophical shoulders and—like good 
postmoderns—live with the contradiction. Religiously, the dogmatism is 
most clear in Chapter 7's Christian apologetic. If you are going to trace a 
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direct line from the neoclassical model of God to the claim that "the Christ 
event is universal," then you have a problem with the integrity of non-
Christian religions that is simply not satisifed by seeing them as auxiliary 
sources of wisdom, and you have an even bigger problem when, faced with 
the claims of other religions, you declare this very same Christianity to be 
only "relatively adequate" immediately after you have pronounced it "uni-
versally valid" (156). 
In the end, if by their fruits you shall know them, M.'s theoretical un-
derpinnings are retroactively validated by the orthopraxis to which they 
lead. But what are we to say of those who share the orthopraxis while they 
remain unpersuaded by the metaphysics, perhaps because of its very neat-
ness? 
Fairfield University, Connecticut PAUL LAKELAND 
WOMEN AND REDEMPTION: A THEOLOGICAL HISTORY. By Rosemary Rad-
ford Ruether. Minneapolis: Fortress, 1998. Pp. xi + 366. $45; $19. 
Through a study of Christian history, Ruether traces paradigms of gen-
der in relation to the Christian claim of redemption in Christ. This book 
makes a valuable contribution to feminist theology because, as R. remarks, 
many Christian feminists have been locked in a paradigm "in which tradi-
tion is dismantled or bypassed." They tend to return to the original Jesus, 
leaping from "an appropriation of this original 'truth' to a reconstruction of 
theology for one's own time and context" (279). R. presents her project as 
a dialectical synthesis between Catholic theology's notion of ongoing in-
spired development and Protestantism's emphasis on the return to Chris-
tian origins. Her own Roman Catholic theological instincts emerge in the 
way she connects redemption so closely with theological anthropology and 
the doctrine of creation. Her commitments to global solidarity, ecological 
justice, and interreligious dialogue are evident in the multicultural scope of 
her study and in her stated conviction that feminist theology is not an 
exclusively Christian project. 
R. begins with an examination of gender equality in the Jesus movement. 
She argues that women's participation in that movement was aided by its 
dissolution of status hierarchies, lack of fixed leadership roles, and use of 
the home as worship space. Clearly alluding to the work of Elisabeth 
Schtissler Fiorenza, R. contends that this situation does not constitute "a 
discipleship of equals" understood as "a programmatic theory or a general 
practice of social equality between men and women," but an "ad hoc 
situation" that allowed some gifted women to evangelize, teach, and lead 
prayer (23-24). 
Throughout, R. stresses the diversity of Christianity. In the case of early 
Christianity, for instance, she argues that the Pauline churches were di-
vided between those which moved toward greater patriarchalization and 
those that advocated spiritual equality for women. Such attention to mul-
